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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC COMPANY 
and/or HOME INSURANCE/HOME 
INDEMNITY, 
Respondents. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 890052CA 
Category No. 6 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER ORVILLE K. WROLSTAD 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review an order of the Utah State Industrial Commission 
pursuant to Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents are mistaken in their view that a 
severability clause is required before a court can strike an 
unconstitutional provision from the balance of a statute. A 
court may sever unconsitutional portions of a statute if the 
balance of the statute will serve a legitimate legislative 
purpose. 
Respondents claim that because the constitution-
ality of Utah's Occupational Disease Disability Law was upheld 
41 years ago in Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining and 
Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948), the court is bound by 
the Masich decision under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Mr. Wrolstad raises a legal challenge in this case that was 
not raised by Mr. Masich. Mr. Wrolstad claims that the court 
is not prevented from reviewing the constitutionality of the 
statute or any portion thereof because changes in factual 
circumstances have altered the premises upon which the statute 
was passed. 
Respondents argue that the court should defer to 
legislative judgment. However, the right to recover for 
personal injuries is an important substantive right. There-
fore, the court should utilize an intermediate level of 
scrutiny to determine whether the statute of repose is 
constitutional. 
The semantic argument made by respondents that 
Section 35-2-13(a)(2) is a condition for payment rather than a 
statute of repose is ineffective. Mr. Wrolstad's constitu-
tional rights have been infringed regardless of how Section 
35-2-13(a)(2) is characterized. 
Contrary to Respondents1 belief, the Administrative 
Law Judge found that Mr. Wrolstad satisfied the statute of 
limitations found in Section 35-2-48. Furthermore, respon-
dents1 failure to file a Motion for Review in a timely manner 




LEGISLATION NEED NOT CONTAIN A SEVERABILITY 
CLAUSE TO SEVER AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTION 
OF A STATUTE FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL PORTION. 
Respondents cite Berry v. Beech Air Craft, 717 P. 2d 
760 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that because no sever-
ability clause is contained in Utah's Occupational Disease 
Disability Law, if one section is found unconstitutional, the 
entire statute must be invalidated. 
Respondents1 interpretation of Berry is mistaken* 
In actuality, Berry does not hold that legislation must con-
tain a severability clause in order to strike unconstitutional 
portions of a statute. Under Berry, a court is permitted to 
sever unconstitutional portions of a statute if the remaining 
portions will serve a legitimate legislative purpose. Berry, 
717 P.2d at 686. 
The language in Berry is consistent with other Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. In In re: Woodward, 384 P.2d 110 
(Utah 1963), the court held that if part of a statute offends 
the constitution, the non-offending portion is not rendered 
invalid. Woodward, 384 P.2d at 113. Similarly, in State v. 
Nielson, 426 P.2d 13 (Utah 1967), the court stated that: "The 
fact that a part of a statute is held to be unconstitutional 
does not necessarily mean that the other parts are also void. 
The void part may be disregarded and the valid part enforced." 
Nielson, 426 P.2d at 14. Finally, in Matheson v. Ferry, 657 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court held that the absence 
of a severability clause does not prevent severability when: 
"the fundamental legislative intent may be effectuated in the 
absence of the unconstitutional provisions." Matheson, 657 
P.2d at 241. 
Based on the cited authority, respondents1 fears 
that the entire Occupational Disease Disability Law must be 
invalidated if any portion of it is determined to be uncon-
stitutional is unfounded. If the statute of repose contained 
in Utah Code Ann. Section 35-2-13(a)(2) is found unconstitu-
tional, the court is not required to invalidate the remainder 
of the Occupational Disease Disability Law as long as it 
serves a legitimate legislative purpose. 
Mr. Wrolstad contends that Section 35-2-13(a)(2) can 
be severed without defeating the purpose of the Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Law. The balance of the statute 
provides workers a scheme of compensation designed to assist 
workers in a time of need. Furthermore, by striking Section 
35-2-13(a)(2), the Occupational Disease Disability Law is more 
equitably applied. Under the current law, victims of diseases 
caused by ionizing radiation are exempt from the statute of 
repose. On the other hand, in order to receive compensation, 
workers such as Mr. Wrolstad who contract disease after being 
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require that i t be IUIIOWMI, in MaIan v. Lewis 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that: "A ruling that 
a statute is constitutional does not thereafter become immune 
from reconsideration when • • . new factual circumstances 
arise that alter the premises upon which the challenged 
statute was passed." Malan, 593 P.2d at 668, 669. 
During the 41 years since Masich was decided, 
medical science has advanced tremendously. There is much more 
known today about how exposure to toxic substances can cause 
disease after long latency periods. Mr. Wrolstad contends 
that the 41 years of medical advancements constitutes a change 
in factual circumstances which alters the premises upon which 
the Occupational Disease Disability Law was enacted and that 
the court is not precluded by the doctrine of stare decisis 
from reconsidering the constitutionality of the Occupational 
Disease Disability Law or any portion thereof. 
POINT III 
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN UTAHfS OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW VIOLATES THE OPEN 
COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Respondents seem to argue that in determining the 
constitutionality of a statute, the court should use the 
standard of minimum rationality and defer to the Legislature. 
They claim that if Mr. Wrolstad feels the statute is unfair, 
he has the burden of pressuring the Legislature to change the 
law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there are 
constitutional restraints on legislative power in order to 
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Mr. Wrolstad claims that an intermediate standard 
of review should be used to determine whether Section 
35-2-13(a)(2) is constitutional. "Not only is the right to be 
compensated for injuries closely related to fundamental 
rights, but additionally, it does not fit into the 'commer-
cial1 rights description which is characteristic of the 
rational basis standard of review." University Hospital, 107 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. The right to recover for personal 
injuries is an important substantive right. University 
Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14. Mr. Wrolstad1s loss of 
health and well-being justifies the imposition of an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENTS1 ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE 
SECTION 35-2-13(a)(2) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE DISABILITY LAW AS A CONDITION FOR 
PAYMENT RATHER THAN A STATUTE OF REPOSE 
DOES NOT FURTHER THEIR ARGUMENT. 
Respondents claim that Mr. Wrolstad has mischarac-
terized Section 35-2-13(a)(2) as a statute of repose. A 
statute of repose is a time bar to a cause of action that 
begins running from an occurrence of an event other than the 
occurrence of the injury that gives rise to the cause of 
action. Berry v. Beech Air Craft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 
1985). Section 35-2-13(a)(2) clearly meets that definition of 
a statute of repose as the time bar begins running on the last 
date the employee works for the employer against whom 
compensation Is sought. Respondents, by attempting I II 
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I'd IN'1 ' ' 
PETITIONER SATISFIED THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS REQUIREMENT FOUND IN 
SECTION 35-2-48, 
Respou^ . re: aranp 
s^.s^v *-^ ,
 M-e- \,,0 >tature of limitations rouno Ln section 
disabled on February 10, 1986 and did not file his claim until 
February 25, 1988 exceeding the one year statute of limita-
tions. Respondents fail to acknowledge that the Administra-
tive Law Judge found that Mr. Wrolstad was diagnosed as 
suffering from asbestosis on February 5, 1987 and that a claim 
filed on June 18, 1987 satisfied the statute of limitations 
reguirement. If respondents disputed the Administrative Law 
Judge's determination on this matter they could have filed a 
Motion for Review. Respondents' failure to file a Motion for 
Review in a timely fashion deprives the court of jurisdiction 
to reconsider the Administrative Law Judge's determination 
that the statute of limitations reguirement was satisfied. 
See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 100 
Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents advance no arguments to uphold the 
constitutionality of the statute of repose found in the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law. Therefore, petitioner 
reguests that the court find the statute of repose as 
violative of the Utah Constitution and strike it from the 
balance of the law. 
DATED this e*/ day of June, 1989. 
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